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ABSTRACT

This report presents the methodology and some of the results from part of an on-going Rand Corporation study of change agent programs sponsored by the U.S. Office of Education. It concentrates on staff development as a vehicle for change in schools. After a brief introduction, the methodology of the study is presented. The third section examines the initiation of various projects. Section four concerns implementation and is divided into (a) project characteristics, and (b) organizational and personal characteristics. Section five deals with the impact and effect of the school on the project. The sixth section discusses the evidence of short-term behavioral change which could be attributed to the projects. The last two sections discuss the longer term outcomes which these projects may have--section seven focuses on what characteristics of the project were likely to be continued after the end of federal support, and section eight concentrates on whether the project was disseminated to other schools or districts. (PB)

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THE POLITICS OF STAFF DEVELOPMENT

A paper prepared for the symposium on "The Field Study of Programs for Educational Change," American Educational Research Association, March 31, 1975, Washington, D.C.

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I. INTRODUCTION

In the recent past, it has been relatively easy to effect school reform through teacher turn-over and recruitment. As long as teacher mobility remained high, a principal could on replacing perhaps as much as one-fifth of the staff in any given year. By recruiting and hiring with careful attention to teacher characteristics, a majority of the school's staff could be replaced and the school itself could be substantially reformed within the space of a few short years.

But now and for the forseeable future, teacher mobility has been greatly constricted by the teacher surplus, the availability of maternity leaves, the need for multiple incomes per family, and the effects of unionization. In New York City, for example, a beginning teacher assigned to a given school can anticipate spending five to seven years in that school before accruing the seniority necessary even to request a transfer. The point is, that school reform must be accomplished with existing personnel. More than ever before, those who seek to change schools must change the people now working in the schools.

The euphemism for that is staff development and it must be one of the mainstay techniques of educational innovation in the future. This paper presents the methodology and some of the results from part of an on-going Rand Corporation study of Office of Education-sponsored change agent programs. The paper is based on the results from the field work, or case analysis phase of the Rand study and is concentrated on staff development as a vehicle for change in schools. The analysis and conclusions in the current paper are the result of a secondary analysis of the data and are the author's sole responsibility.[1]

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1. The interested reader is referred to the complete reports from the first year of the project. See especially, Peter W. Greenwood, Dale Mann, Milbrey Wallin McLaughlin, FEDERAL PROGRAMS SUPPORTING EDUCATIONAL CHANGE, Vol. III: THE PROCESS OF CHANGE (Santa Monica, Rand Corporation, R-1589/HEW, Dec. 1974). Other volumes relevant to the first year of the project are: R-1598/1-HEW, A MODEL OF EDUCATIONAL CHANGE, Vol I; R-1589/2-HEW, FACTORS AFFECTING CHANGE AGENT PROJECTS, Vol II; R-1589/3-HEW, THE FINDINGS IN REVIEW, Vol. IV; and R-1589/5-HEW, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, Vol. V.

II. METHODOLOGY

The staff development team was bound by the study's general guidelines for data collection and analysis.[2] Thus, only deviations from the general methodology description given elsewhere need be noted. A factor list for case descriptions was developed to guide data collection on project features that were thought to be important variables in staff development. Trainees, for example, were described by demography, experience, recruitment, selection, amount of participation, timing of participation, extent and amount of expected change and so on. (Those factors which turned out to be most clearly related to successful projects are discussed below.)

The trainers were described according to their demographic match with the trainee population, their position inside or outside the organizational site of the training, their participation in the control of the project and so on.

Factors related to the training methods included: the format or procedure used (lecture, discussion group, etc.); duration; functional area of the skill to be developed; the number of skills to be developed; and, the degree of integration between the training experience and the trainees' work experience.

The projects chosen for the field study varied along most of the above dimensions. They were located in all parts of the country and in communities ranging from a rural hamlet to a core city megalopolis. (Additional project descriptions are available below.) The field team conducted 50 to 100 interviews in each place visited. The number of schools visited in each place varied from 5 to 20. Our interviews ordinarily began at the top of the system and followed the project down through the administrative hierarchy to the teachers in the various schools. Interviews ranged from 45 minutes to 2 hours and were sometimes repeated to verify important points.

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2. See the companion paper prepared for this symposium, Dale Mann, "An Introduction to the Rand Corporation's Study of the Change Agent Programs Sponsored by the U.S. Office of Education," AERA, March 31, 1975, Washington, D.C.

It is reasonable to wonder whether a valid picture of staff development change-agent projects can be developed in the space of an 8 or 10 person-day field visit. In response to the question, it is relevant but hardly sufficient to point out that the staff development research team had logged visits to more than 400 schools for purposes of qualitative research. In addition, the team's observations were guided by the project's overall research protocols and by special materials for this topic. Those materials were based on an extensive survey of the literature of planned change and a thorough reconceptualization of that topic as it applied to schools. From that work, there emerged a series of preliminary hypotheses and propositions to be explored in this part of the fieldwork. Finally, all staff development cases were returned to the project directors in draft form for their comments. The interaction which resulted was sometimes painful but almost always helpful in correcting and even extending matters of fact, emphasis, and interpretation. The majority of those people most intimately familiar with the projects - that is their directors - found the cases to be useful representations and interpretations of their experiences. None questioned their factual accuracy. Thus, we have a considerable degree of confidence in the data on which these findings have been based.

Still, it should be recognized that we are dealing with data which is almost clinical in nature. Implementation, adaptation, subtle modifications over time, and the other phenomena we sought to document would have been extremely difficult to capture with techniques appropriate to a larger sample. Additionally, we found that project titles sometimes bore little or no relation to the on-site activities, the quality of evidence available from evaluations varied wildly, and there was practically no documentation of school site or delivery level effects. Finally of course, there was the problem of how to distribute scarce analytic resources given the foregoing realities. Thus, the generalizations in this paper are based on an intensive examination of five sites through the procedures described above. (Since the extensive survey-data based phase and the intensive case analysis phase overlapped in some significant areas, the Rand project will offer an interesting opportunity to compare the utility of the two techniques.)

This paper concentrates on describing a process of mutual adaptation, implementation, and changes which has been

generalized from the data. It uses illustrations as often as possible but necessarily concentrates on a process description, not on the description of multiple contexts. The reader is invited to compare the evidence of this paper with his or her own experience and with the case materials themselves.[3]

III. INITIATION

Why and how did the projects begin? Where did the idea come from? How much support was necessary from how many people?

The literature on planned change stresses the importance of a high level of felt need to change. The idea occurs in two different forms: (1) The "goal seeking" or "rational" model in which the impetus for change comes from an intention to move from existing patterns to desired future states; and (2) a "problem solving" orientation in which dissatisfaction with current situations prompts construction of a definitive remedy. None of our staff development projects were initiated in response to a widespread and significant felt need to change. In fact, it was always assumed that the objects of the project's efforts, those people who were to be "developed" (changed) would resist that effort, deny the project's utility, and otherwise be obstacles to change. Most projects came into being because of a small nucleus or cell of individuals who operated independently of or in opposition to the wishes of district superordinates and the trainee group as well.

The "goal-seeking" or "rational" model explained very little about these projects' initiation. Most school districts

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3. The complete staff development cases are available in Appendix A of Greenwood, Mann, McLaughlin, FEDERAL PROGRAMS SUPPORTING EDUCATIONAL CHANGE.

store their needs in a bottomless pit. When outside money from any source and for virtually any purpose appears to be available, the district fishes around in the pit until it finds the need that matches the announced purpcses of the soft money. That need is then elevated to the status of a priority in order to demonstrate the district's commitment, and not incidentally in order to capture funds. The process is exactly why so many districts object to having their programs jerked in so many different directions by program specific, rather than general or bloc assistance. The point here is that the process invalidates the central tenet of a goal seeking model of change. From the point of view of the Federal government, the opportunism evident in this process is probably a useful characteristic since it demonstrates district responsiveness (at least initially) to a Federal agenda.

Because it is less grand, "problem solving" seems to be a slightly more accurate characterization of the motives for initiation. But the "problem solving" approach we saw was one in which districts moved not so much toward any carefully conceptualized future, as away from what ever problems were most pressing and which could be ameliorated (note, not "solved") by someone else's money.*

The planning activity is also a noticeable departure from the synoptic rational model. If the practice of searching for alternatives implies the conscious generation of the different options available in some universe of potential solutions prior to initiationg the project, then there simply was no such search. The alternatives that did get considered more were those that were immanent in the experience or education of the small group of project initiators. The "linkage" to universities, other schools, or R and D institutions was not a heavily travelled path. (Although alternatives were noticeable by their absence at the project's initiation, the entire process of modification and mutual influence between the project and the site in the implementation stage can be considered a search for alternatives.)

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* Since we were looking only at places with Federally supported projects, it is obvious that those places were using someone else's money. Clearly there are other, indigenous problem solving efforts -- reorganizing, program redirection, new program starts and so on.

Planning as a programming or scheduling activity might have been provoked by the proposal writing requirements for Federal grants. We did find extensive planning to be related to the success of the projects, but the explanation for that lay not in the intrinsic value of the planning activity but in the fact that the most successful projects were also the most ambitious, complicated and thus demanding of good planning. In all cases, proposal writing was regarded as a vaguely distasteful grantmanship necessity which no one took very seriously.

Since most districts now recognize that they can with impunity take virtually any amount of someone else's money to try to do virtually any task, they regard the proposal process with extreme fatalism. The more important point here has to do with the impossibility of making a prior specification of the career of an untested intervention in a complex and unknown behavioral system. In only rare (and uninteresting) circumstances can there be a behaviorally adequate prior specification of the sort necessary to support detailed planning (and the subsequent accountability for the realization of that plan.) Two important consequences follow. In most districts the possibility of good planning is prematurely deprecated; second, because of cynicism, people fall far short of the achievements they might otherwise realize.

Widespread planning participation is supposed to be useful but was only tried in one case where the OD stress on autochthonous change clearly and persistently subordinated any other behavioral change to the attitudinal breakthrough which was thought to be a necessary precursor to all else. Thus, all the trainees' planned what, if anything they wanted to happen to themselves. The fact that two of the project's three years had been consumed while the population alleged to be in need of training decided first how it felt about that and second what was to be done about that was justified by reference to the truth-trust sine qua non of significant (OD) behavioral change. As noted above, many projects were run by small, almost conspiratorial cells of people who were working to replace the status quo. Increased decisional participation would have invited foxes into the chicken coop.

The best summary characterization of the initiation process in these cases was (a) the recognition of some outside resources which might (b) be applied to an emergent generalized need for change in someone else's behavior as determined by a small group of middle-level people, who then (c) plunged into the first project treatment that satisficed them and the funding agency.

Selection of the target group was ordinarily done at the same moment and by the same people that determined the "idea" or need for change itself. That is, most ideas seemed to have occurred in terms of the need to change (some group's) behavior. It should be noted that specifying the target group and identifying those individuals within the group to be trained are two distinctly different activities. In no case did target groups select themselves as the needed focus of change. In fact, there was very little evidence of either support or opposition from the trainee population at the initiation stage of the project. In general, they were unaware of what was to happen to them, or if they knew of the projects' existence, its goals were stated in such softy-lofty terms that no one could object. Those projects with more precise purposes pointed more directly at identifiable groups were also more likely to encounter the early opposition of those groups. As trainee identity increased in terms of specialization (e.g., high school math teachers, special ed curriculum developers, etc.) that identity gave rise to opposition.

IV. IMPLEMENTATION

Part A: Project Characteristics

Several interesting features about the goals of staff development projects are most clearly on display in the implementation stage. Implementation begins when the project settles down to the hard work of trying to influence teacher behavior. But the vast majority of teachers believe in what they are already doing, not in what some newly-arrived change-agent project might want them to do. Those convictions may not be very firmly held or clearly displayed, but the teachers own professional behavior is still a basic point of orientation. That reality created a dilemma for all projects. The prior, public identification of the group whose behavior was to be changed was very likely to increase the resistance of that group to the project's efforts. The more in need of change was the group, the more important it was that they not be invidiously labeled.* Thus, most projects used public goals that were more than usually amorphous. The vagueness of the goal sets was compounded by the irony that many of the outcomes of staff development were difficult to state in behavioral terms susceptible to measurement.

We also sought to document how far the project's goals diverged from those of the district. On the face of it, a set of operational goals at odds with those of the larger district is not such an outrageous expectation for a change-oriented activity. We found instead a strong need for protective coloration. To survive, it was generally important to encourage people to believe that the project represented only a relatively small change in their existing practices. Schools are continuing organizations and their

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*This holds only for models of cooperative and semi-cooperative change. Where conflict is to be the engine of change, prior labeling may very well be a good tactic to get the target group's attention. Many people deny the possibility of any change in education except through the cooperative route. On the basis of these cases, that attitude seems as much a description of the problem as a valid conclusion. The purpose of public policy remains the regular achievement of public goods...under any circumstances but especially in instances of conflict or disagreement which are after all the most significant environment for public policy.

pre-project methods represent distributions of benefits and power and are thus the objects of fierce loyalty. Although to the outsider, pre-existing goals may seem to be meaningless generalities, they have very frequently been the focus of bitter conflict, painfully resolved. A direct challenge to those goals might lose the change-agent challenger even the chance to try by destroying access and by mobilizing the opposition. The notion of change as an organizational summum bonum which is held in such esteem by various non-LEA levels is in fact a kiss-of-death handicap in many districts. And since many of those same districts are the most in need of change, the committed change-agent is presented with an interesting choice between candor and effectiveness. Second, change often means more work and more uncertainty - two things most teachers and other people strive to avoid. By relating project goals to what exists, the trainees' perceptions of the anticipated work necessary to incorporate the change and the uncertainty associated with it could both be reduced. For these reasons, most projects pretended that their goals had been founded on pre-existing larger system goals, although they were not.

The "real" or operational set of goals is more difficult to analyze partly because they are more subtly stated. In the most successful projects, the goals of those projects were dramatically at odds with those of their parent systems. In one case the school board was legislating the length and flexibility of paddles with which the students could be punished while the project was trying to move its teacher trainees from material to symbolic reinforcements of student behavior. In another case, while the project was trying to individualize instruction, the board was mandating a single district-wide lesson plan.

Where the goals of the project included attention to strongly held cultural values (attitudes about race, ethnic pluralism, student responsibilities) the projects tended to concentrate on the supposedly more neutral and technical aspects of pedagogy and consistently avoided engaging controversies. Thus projects that started out to deal with race ended up working on instructional techniques.

The amount of change attempted is another goal-related characteristic. Even though they could not broadcast their intentions, the best projects set out to make a big difference, to help people to depart substantially and radically from their previous patterns. Less successful projects contributed more to organizational maintenance than

to organizational change. Big change aspirations are probably functional because they provide their participants with early motivation and commitment and because when the inevitable compromises come (see "Adaptation" below) ambitious projects can still salvage a reputable and significant portion of their purposes.

A second measure of the ambition of a project is the extent of its intended changes. This refers to the portion of a school site or "critical mass" which must be affected before the implementation can actually take hold. Here the strong social sanctions of the school as a small band of professionals exerted itself very strongly. An occasional maverick could buck those sanctions and implement the changed behavior in isolation. But the much more common pattern was for the school to single out rate-busters and to deprecate or ostracize them until they regressed to the mean. It should be remembered that change is an indictment of existing practice and of existing practitioners: in its field reality, it is not a state devoutly to be sought, nor is it a clinical, bloodless, consensual process. It was resisted by teachers who were threatened by it. For these reasons, it was important to succeed with enough of a school building's staff to provide a potentially self-contained unit. Allowing for defections, backsliding, and partial implementation, that usually meant not fewer than 20-25% of the school's staff had to be successfully trained with project's techniques.

The first aspect of the project treatment itself is the complexity of the design. Complexity was not related to size. We saw very, very simple projects that were enormously costly; one project amounted to not much more than a lot of project personnel doing the same things that they wanted teachers to do. It was both the least complex and the least successful. For one thing, no one had thought through the complicated problems entailed in behavioral change in that metropolitan, central-city district. Or, if they had, they despaired of accomplishing anything and got overwhelmed by the virulent situational factors for which the site is famous. On the other hand, one of the most successful projects was fabulously and endlessly complicated - a sort of educational Gaudi design. This is a curious finding since the probability of successful implementatin would seem to go down as the number of necessary precursor contingencies goes up. Yet the most successful projects relied on various inputs, the availability of different sorts of actor attitudes, long chains of changes and events, and so on. The message may be that no lesser sort of

effort will suffice and the risks of complexity are a necessary concomitant to success.

The most successful projects developed their own materials. The quality of the materials seemed not to make as much difference as the fact that they had been tailored to the site by project staff. Indigenous development had a number of important benefits. For one, locally developed curriculum can counteract the parochiality of teachers, most of whom believe that no one else can possibly know anything of their situations. This probably enhances the chances that the project's treatments are pointed at problems which its trainees feel are significant. A more important benefit had to do with the personal investment and thus also the commitment represented in self-developed material. When the trainers wrote their own guides and curricula, they knew it better and believed in it more than if they had simply adopted pre-existing materials.

Successful materials were those which offered a number of alternate points of entry (e.g., classroom physical organization, child self-concept, diagnostic procedures, etc.) so that teachers could begin wherever they felt they needed help. That is related to anotherimportant characteristic -- the opportunity for early success. Praise, material rewards, changed student performance, or even self-satisfaction were provided early. Some projects offered money rewards for completing units of training; others provided released time. The availability of material rewards was not a significant incentive for teachers to start the training, but it was a useful reinforcement to continue it.

In an area where graduate training is notorious for the level of its standards, it is interesting to note that three of the projects incorporated tough-minded evaluation of what the trainees had or had not acquired. One project was especially active in that regard. Failure to pass a component competence examination was a relatively frequent experience, but rather than being discouraged, the trainees seemed to feel that it contributed credibility to the training experience and distinguished it from many of the demeaning "Mickey Mouse" institutes and workshops to which they had been exposed.

The extent of "packaging" was also related to the success of the training experience. At the one extreme, a completely "unpackaged" project sent teacher trainers out to work rather spontaneously on their trainee's classroom problems. Unfortunately, the change efforts then got linked tightly to the presence of the trainers. At the other extreme, a training staff stayed largely in one place, preparing kits and auto-

instructional packages which they then mailed to their clients.

The most powerful program had the following characteristics:

(1) The simple availability, over time, of the training staff as a source of help on the trainees' demand and on the trainees' problems. This reduced the teachers' apprehension that change projects meant more unrealistic work for them.

(2) The provision of a demonstration lesson done by the trainer with the trainees' classes but with no participation or responsibility on the part of the trainee. That helped establish the trainer's credibility and the treatment's feasibility.

(3) Provision of multi-media, multi-topic, self-paced, auto-instructional teaching packages for the trainee's independent use. It should be kept in mind that many teachers do not like to read.

(4) The credible, non-invidious, independent evaluation of individual progress at relatively frequent intervals by people outside the teachers' school-based chain of command and unrelated to the teacher's "official," permanent-record performance evaluation. Only one project was able with impunity to build the principal's participation into the teacher's evaluation. Needless to say, that place did not have a union or even a strong teachers association.

The most successful projects were managed by a "cell" of individuals somewhat isolated from the rest of the system. Given the seriousness with which they took their task to change (i.e., challenge) that system, and given the power of the rest of the organization, that isolation seemed prudent.

On the other hand, projects that aspired to teacher change must deal with the teacher's boss - the principal. The projects which achieved the least of their own change-oriented agendas did so in large part because building principals re-directed or subverted project efforts once they reached the school building level. Most building principals were not in favor of the staff development efforts at least in part because such projects challenge the principal's traditional role as the instructional leader, master teacher, or chief teacher trainer in the school. Second, the project was almost bound to try to move teachers away from practices

already sanctioned by the responsible head of the school, the principal. Few principals opposed the initiation of projects, but many opposed project efforts once they had crossed the school's threshhold. Two projects tried to do an end run around the principals to the teachers. In one case it succeeded if only because of the passivity and unsophistication of that group of principals. In the other case, the principals lost a few of the early battles and then won the war with a sort of scorched earth strategy directed against project personnel.

Resource allocation patterns attested to the power of the principals. Where project resources were made available to principals for use at their own discretion they were largely used to maintain and buttress the status quo (cover ordinary classes, act as substitutes, etc.). Where resource allocation remained in project hands, project purposes were better served and where, because of political opposition from the principals, they could not be served at least the project staff was able to negotiate the terms of certain compromises.

The criteria for resource allocation within projects are about what might be expected. Project goals did not completely govern but did so in combination with other criteria such as (a) the prior social access of the training staff to trainees, (b) the accessibility of grade levels to treatment, (c) the demands of a particular treatment, (d) state law, and - in all cases (e) purely situational, idiosyncratic, largely uncontrolled, and largely unanticipated factors.

Planning seems to be directly related to success. The projects which had achieved the most could also communicate where they were going and how they hoped to get there. They also had the decision-assisting technology to back that vision. The phenomenon seemed to be much more than simply the presence of good management mechanisms: it reflected the active and positive orientation to the events and contingencies that buffeted all of the projects. Some drifted and no one cared very much; others worked hard to achieve what they set out to do.

Evaluation in the sense of informal but serious stock taking by project staff and district clientele was an important activity in the most successful projects. They paid attention to it and they changed because of it. Evaluation in the sense of formal project assessment for the state and Federal grantors was done to continue to qualify for money, not for its utility to project management.

Trainee Characteristics-

The people to be developed strongly influenced the success or failure of the projects. The clearest relationship between any trainee characteristic and project success had to do with the grade level of the teacher. The higher the grade level, the more resistant to training was the teacher. The effect was so clear that no project examined was able to have any impact on a high school. A number of things about high schools seemed to be at work here.

°The high school curriculum is topically organized with teachers who relate to their topical fields more than to an overall schooling mission. They are ordinarily more oriented to substantive concerns than to process concerns. While most change projects emphasized process, high school teachers consistently subordinated process considerations to topic coverage.

°Topic specialization provides a source of identity and an organizing base which makes high school teachers believe themselves to be superior to their lower grade colleagues. That specialization strengthens defenses against outsiders and makes resistance to change easier and more effective.

°High school faculties are often already split into antagonistic groups of "core", "solids" or "academic" teachers and "electives" teachers. The lack of cooperation between those factions makes things like scheduling changes and team teaching very difficult to realize. The teachers believe in the compartments that they have locked themselves into. Norms of local unanimity further freeze this situation. (One group's cohesively expressed desires will not be interfered with by another group.)

°The baby boom has not yet ebbed in the high schools which remain relatively overcrowded thus affording teachers there less free time and organizational slack than is currently available in lower grades.

°High school teachers deal more briefly with many more and older students and thus tend to blame the anonymous mass of threatening students more than themselves for the failure of schooling. That diminishes the sense of personal responsibility and thus the felt need to change.

°Students who fail or who are failed by the high school simply go away and are not persistent problems within the same organization. That too diminishes the felt need for change.

°Because high schools are larger and more specialized with more intermediate organizational layers, high school teachers are less dependent on their principals than are elementary school teachers and thus more difficult to influence through the chain of command.

°High school faculties are usually more unionized than elementary colleagues and thus less malleable with respect to "extra" demands of training programs.

°There is far less parent and community pressure on high schools than on other levels of schooling.

°Because their content specialization gives them greater mobility, high school teachers have more options. Thus fewer high school teachers move into the central office non-school career middle management posts from which special projects are often staffed. That reduces the number of school "hands" on training projects and makes access back to the high schools that much harder.

The other strong relationship in the area of trainee characteristics had to do with the way in which they joined the project. Most projects devoted most of their resources and had most of their impact on people who volunteered for the training. There are several reasons for this volunteer focus. By definition, volunteers are easier to attract into the project and easier to train than are their more recalcitrant colleagues. They tend to be the "friends and neighbors" of the project staff members; thus, as a more congenial group sharing many assumptions, the initial training is easier to conduct and moves faster. Since most projects had been designed with the hope of working effectively with a more difficult population, the early successes with the volunteers are gratifying, especially so for the people who are uncertain about the sufficiency and reception of their techniques and who need early successes to justify their further efforts. In addition, special projects which are untried and struggling for credibility and support, seldom have the political clout to require participation. Often the premises of the training

techniques (OD, for example) make it inappropriate to force participation . The teachers' organizations, their regular responsibilities, and their professional status usually are sufficient protection from such mandates anyway. Thus, the focus on a training population of volunteers.

Unfortunately, that early concentration on volunteers had some deleterious effects. First, it misled trainers about what to expect. Second, it often encouraged them to modify their training agenda based on experiences with volunteers which then did not work at all when (or if) the project took on a non-volunteer audience. Third, it created obligations and expectations for continued service which subtly steered the project's resources toward the most receptive audiences -- the volunteers. But, since most volunteers already agree with the project's premises and are eager for its treatment (why else volunteer?) the result was to allocate the most resources where they were least needed. Where they tried to affect high schools at all, for example, projects did so only in their last year of existence, after they had saturated the more malleable trainee groups. An additional effect comes from the successful training of volunteers. Since they usually learn quickly, and well, the volunteer-trainees returned to their schools as true believers searching for converts. Schools are in many ways like the army and in both places anyone who volunteers for anything is regarded as peculiar, if not a little touched. The enthusiasm of those newly-trained volunteers convinced many of their unreconstructed peers that the project was for radicals and other eccentrics. Thus, some training staffs got a distorted reputation and diminished their chances of building bridges to the larger group, more in need of the training. The whole sequence is as understandable as it is serious in its impact on program direction and success.

The extent to which trainees perceived the need for their own (further) development is an important but complicated characteristic. Certainly that perceived need facilitated acceptance of treatment and enhanced the chance of success. But where was it to come from? Where projects were initiated because of particular crisis (racial outbursts, rampant drug abuse) the perceived need often related only to that crisis and not to underlying causes. But, when the crisis was resolved the impetus for change disappeared. One project made a concerted effort to create crises in order to get the attention of people who believed themselves to be working within a largely healthy organization. The tactic was not successful.

The matter of a perceived need seems to be related to the role area implicated by the training. Successful projects managed to convince their populations that the training was relevant to a central role area but not so important as to be threatening or overwhelming. Trainees needed to see that they were being asked to make small changes related to big goals. Creating that perceived need was an extremely delicate business. The next question is, what should be done in its absence? Once the project had exhausted its pool of volunteers, the rest of the potential trainee population was likely to feel that they were doing OK without the project. The vivid shift that occurred in this single behavioral characteristic -- from those who wanted the project's treatment to those who didn't -- would seem to dictate two distinctly different training techniques, yet no projects made an adequate response to that shift.

The defensive characteristics of the non-volunteer audience need some explanation. As a whole, teachers are relatively insecure individuals who must try to perform virtually impossible tasks with a technology which is inadequate or simply wrong. Defensiveness and secretiveness are understandable attitudes where the circumstances demand a professional, pedagogical role performance even though there is no sufficient knowledge about what causes good teaching and learning. Finally, because teachers recognize that they are supposed to perform intellectual tasks, and because their intellect is clearly on display in most kinds of professional interaction (especially in training sessions) the safest performance is the least performance. Thus, to guard themselves from negative evaluation, they simply clammed up. It is hard to train clams.

Another question deals with the reinforcement of the trainees' behavior as opposed to the redirection of it. Most of the teachers who enacted most of the training said that they had already been doing a version of the new behavior, that the project only added to what they had learned elsewhere, and so on. Part of this was certainly self-protection (the stigma of "not knowing" is very strong among quasi-professionals) but it is also an indication of where training may be the most efficient. Still, it should be noted that the group most in need of the project's resources is not the group already moving in that direction but the much larger group at a dead standstill. Although some projects came closer than others, no project seemed able to marshall all of the requirements necessary to effective engagement with that status quo majority.

The one bright spot in this dark picture is the hidden effect which many projects have on that resistant majority. We found some evidence (discussed elsewhere) that resistant teachers nonetheless did modify parts of their behavior although their personal needs were such that they had to deny that they had done so. Thus, "crying 'never', they did."

There is a lot of debate in the literature about the heterophilous/homophilous nature of the trainers in relation to the trainees. The most successful trainers we encountered were those who had paid their dues in the instant client system but who were at some emotional and professional distance from it. The most effective trainers seemed naively enthusiastic and maintained that enthusiasm in the face of reality. Thus they had inside knowledge and surface credibility, plus a critical attitude and some protection from the consequences of that attitude.

Many projects used outside consultants in an attempt to get that critical attitude and the freedom to act on it. All four of the projects which employed outside consultants to train teachers dropped them after the first year. They were simply not credible enough, responsive enough, or available enough to get through.

Part B. Organizational and Personal Characteristics

The project's location in relation to the bureaucracy of the schools was an important characteristic. In one place, those people working to change the larger organization tried to avoid a "project mentality." They believed that their credibility would be damaged if people could discount them as a short-lived hot-house effort with no real responsibilty or staying power. In most of our cases, however, the integrity and partial isolation of the project-cell seemed useful.

The school sites, especially the building principals, exerted an enormous influence on project decisions. Changing staff behavior means changing it away from patterns which have at least the implicit sanction of, and which are the formal responsibility of the school's principal. In addition, teachers depend for many critical things on their principals (desirable teaching assignments, free time, scheduling cooperation, materials and supplies, promotions, protection from parents and other "outsiders," approbation, and exemption from scores of harrassing, petty regulations). Where the principal refused to allow carpet squares in a teacher's classroom (they were alleged to "breed vermin") or where the principal could reduce a teacher to tears in front of her colleagues for allowing "noise" (children talking to other children) or where a principal could dump all of the school's behavior problems on a teacher as a reward for her newly acquired teaching skills in the area of learning disability -- then teachers thought very carefully about their principal's reaction. The training project and staff were temporary phenomena; eventually the teacher would be left to make peace with the school's permanent authority. This anticipated reaction among the training population was central to the success or failure of projects and it gave every principal a built-in avenue to determining the teachers' responses to the development effort.

Thus, every project identified the system's principals as a critical force. How the project dealt with that force -- and how the principals dealt with the project -- was extremely important. Only one project even attempted to buck the principals, entering schools and conducting training sessions on the authority of the superintendent -- a practice that lasted only until the principals association forced the board to rescind the superintendent's authority!

A far more common pattern is that in which the project announced the district-wide availability of its services in tones of muted assertiveness, but when the trainers crossed the school's threshold they worked with teachers identified by the principal and on problems identified by the principal and with the success determined by the principal.

More happily but less frequently, principals sometimes exercised plenary power to reinforce the project. But, since change is almost necessarily a challenge to authority, not many of the school's duly constituted authorities were included to encourage that challenge. In those few cases where they did, the changes were as swift and dramatic as the sort envisioned in a proposal writer's fondest dream.

The process of changing teachers is a sensitive and volatile business often characterized by resentment, hostility, and resistance on the part of professionals who don't feel the need to change. Confrontation was an unpleasant business for the training staff. Moreover, they seldom had the confidence in their own techniques or the authority to assert themselves unilaterally with populations they might choose. Finally, much of the orthodoxy of training procedures stresses working only with volunteers. Consequently, despite the proposal specifications, most training staffs worked most with people they knew already or who shared their own characteristics. Thus, if the training staff was largely from elementary schools, the high school never received any training; if the project director had been a headquarters curriculum specialist, most project contacts with the school were mediated by grade level leaders; and so on. The fact of the matter is that it was easier, less threatening and perhaps more successful to recruit trainees from among one's former associates. The informal communications networks thus definitively steered the application of the project treatment.

We were interested in the effects which project experience might have on the capacity of these districts to innovate and on their propensity to take risks. No clear effects emerged perhaps because most districts welcome soft money for practically any purpose. They have become quite sophisticated about projects, their benefits, and their consequences. Only one project resulted in a net decline in the organization's capacity to innovate. The staff development effort was a very complicated, comprehensive, ambitious and aggressive effort undertaken in a very conservative large city district. The

The horror felt there by the forces of tradition about project activities galvanized them to action. Demotions, dismantlement and reorganization decimated the project staff and demoralized anyone foolish enough to try something new in that district in the foreseeable future. Two others of our case study districts will probably continue to attract soft money and to do as little as possible with it. None of this seems very likely to have an effect on risk-taking propensity. Districts do not make hyper-rational decisions and thus they do not base their initiations decision on probability calculations. Moreover, new people do still pop up and since they never know much about what's been done before them, they will probably try again even where history is against them.

Few effects came through more clearly than the salutary consequences of personal commitment on these projects. Where the staff believed in what they were doing, the projects had a much greater chance to flourish. Could project features themselves encourage that commitment? The most useful incentive seems to have been the visibility or mobility of project personnel. The most successful projects were run by people who reported changes in their careers prospects while the less successful projects were run by people who were comfortably resigned to falling back to classroom teaching at the project's conclusion. The explanation for this is probably related to the animosity which vigorous change attempts engendered. Successful people needed a way to escape from the district and were glad to have it; less successful people could easily sink back into the organizations which they had never challenged.

In line with that, increased responsibility and intrinsic satisfactions probably had a substantial impact on good projects but money, credentials, and promotion did not, nor were they sufficient to produce the commitment necessary to success.

The only possible correlation between project success and the educational background of the project's administration dealt with recency of training and level of training as compared to that of the project's clientele. Project leaders tended to have had recent experiences with graduate school which seems to have armed them with some ideas which they then tried to employ. They also seemed to have more academic credentials than their immediate superiors or than their clientele. There is a sense in which this education may have provided the project's leadership with training relevant to the conduct of the project.

Certainly those projects which provided more training and guidance from the leadership level down to the actual trainer level were more successful than those which didn't.

Age, sex, tenure, previous position, amount of salary from project funds, promotions, and percent of time devoted to project activities did not make much of a difference. Ambition was related to success (although responses here may have tapped only the individual's felt need to move to another district after having survived the change attempt). Similarly, good projects seemed to be run by people who were more career-bound than place-bound.

V. ADAPTATIONS

This category of the process deals with the impact of the school on the project. It was a key area for the Rand field study since we had hypothesized that a great deal of the reported outcomes (and especially short falls) of change agent projects could be attributed to the school's transmogrification of the projects which were supposed to have changed the school.

All projects displayed a clear and similar pattern of adaptations. With the passage of time they: (a) became less ambitious about the system-wide effects they sought; (b) simplified their treatments; (c) slowed the pace of their activities; (d) decreased the amount of changed behavior expected from any individual; and (e) decreased their expectations about how many people within a site could be changed.

Three of the projects examined initially intended to retrain teachers at all levels of their systems, K through 12. All three began with a focus on the elementary school teacher population and then never succeeded in coming to grips with the high schools. It seems clear from all of the cases that the high schools are special and present peculiar obstacles to change agent programs which have already been discussed. Because of subject matter specialization and the loyalties and organizing patterns which follow from that, high school teachers can and do successfully resist change. Other factors that strengthen the autonomy of high school teachers (and thus reduce their availability to training) are the pressures of the job, union ties, student drop-outs -- the high school's failures exit -- and the faculty's relatively greater career mobility. The combined weight of those factors seems to account for the most dramatically simplification encountered in these projects -- the omission of any serious attempt to affect one entire organizational level of schooling.

Ordinarily, a project starts out with a very ambitious agenda of change, in part in order to capture funds. But after the original funding has been secured, there is a switch to the need to justify continued funding and that means demonstrating success with much more discrete, measurable phenomena than those in the original agenda. Unfortunately, the measured phenomena although superficially precise are only a small and usually not very important fragment of the project's goals. One project that began as a total curriculum revolution has its most successful and widespread implementation in the teaching of spelling.

A similar phenomenon operates to reduce the risk involved in a project. Broad and sincere attempts to change organizations and people encounter lots of vivid resistance. Resisting the

resistance burns up the project's capital. When people begin to appreciate how slow and costly change is anyway, they often scale their goals down to match the available resources. Thus projects which had started out to end illiteracy ended up trying to teach any kids just a little bit. Projects that had tried for individualized instruction satisfied themselves to have achieved differentiated small(er) group interaction. Problem solving gives way to remediation. Revolution gives way to reform.

Similar processes operated to simplify the project treatment. The panoply of services and activities and the sequences of phrases and events which characterized many proposals and the initial implementation of projects got diluted as they were transferred from the project leadership to the training staff to the trainees. In one project, for example, a consulting firm which specialized in OD interventions tried to communicate that technology in capsule form to a group of teachers who were then actually to conduct the interventions in their home schools. The result was that one group (the consultants) had all the technology and no responsibility while the teachers had only a little technology and all the responsibility. Consequently, the teachers only employed the simplest and "safest" of the techniques which they had been taught.

The training audience also acts to prune the treatment. The real world knocks a lot of the edges off the ivory tower original conceptualizations on the grounds that they are simply not practical. Thus, some project materials got cut by half, the amount of collateral reading was reduced, the length of training exposure was shortened, etc.

A related phenomenon has to do with the fact that sufficient behavioral intervention is a time-consuming process which, because it is so costly, can only be made available to a relatively small group of people. But where the project was viewed as a benefit or "goodie" to be distributed, there was often pressure to make that benefit available to as many people as possible. Thus, in order to spread the benefit over more people (and not incidentally, to build a base of political support) the treatment was thinned and applied to more people, but with less effect on any given person. Similarly, had we ever found a high demand for services, that project might have been tempted to reduce its treatment so that more people could profit by it.

Treatments also got simplified by being captured. Trainers arriving at the school with an elaborate training routine often discovered that the principal or the teacher-clients had other ideas about how the project staff should be used. The training materials then got bent to the needs of the local situation or simplified in order to accommodate both the project and site agendas.

The next adaptation that most projects experienced had to do with the pace of project activities. Most projects were planned with a client group of the system's most resistant trainees in mind. Thus elaborate treatments were specified but when, as most did, the project opened for business with an audience of volunteers, the training had grossly underestimated the receptivity of that group. Thus, the initial experiences went very well. Then the project began to tackle trainees from increasingly more resistant strata of the population. That clientele change really clamped the brakes on and the pace of change slowed dramatically.

Other things which retarded projects were the loss of the initial enthusiasm, the disillusionment about the amount of forced change or pushing which was feasible, the inevitable logistic and production foul-ups, and the gathering forces of opposition. All projects were immersed in a local political and situational context which could not be escaped or ignored. The fact that newly constructed buildings don't open on time or that unions have jurisdictional disputes, or that community groups misinterpret or oppose the project, etc., was simply a fact of life which had to be dealt with.

Two other things are relevant here. Where projects succeeded, that early success sometimes dampened the perceived need for additional change and slowed further work. And, sometimes, the problem that had provided the initial motivation simply changed. In one case, for example, the drug abuse prevention aspects of a project got vitiated when the wily high school students suddenly switched from abusing drugs to abusing alcohol.

Two other reductions occurred involving the project's goals vis-a-vis individuals. First the amount of change expected of any given individual got reduced from an expected total transformation or behavioral reorientation to just, some change -- however modest. Projects that began intent on impacting the teacher's classroom management with respect to learning rate, learning content, learning style, and so on, ended by settling for the adoption of virtually any improved behavior. Projects which had hoped to individualize instruction were eventually willing to help <u>any</u> departure from the one-on-thirty norm. One project started out to get its teachers to eschew subordination, stop being authority freaks, seize control of their own professional circumstances, take responsibility for their own actions, suspend their hostility and suspicions, increase their time and emotional investment in their jobs (without additional remuneration), and otherwise dramatically depart from the teacher/administrator norm. The project ended up by abandoning its hopes of organizational democracy and measured its final success by the number of student-initiated verbal interchanges in the classroom.

Projects also consistently reduced their expectations about the proportion of people in any given site that they would be able to reach. The proposal version always had high hopes of

widespread impact but the later project experience was considerably more modest. The diminution demonstrates the gap between the trainers' intentions and the classroom teacher's prerogative and responsibility to implement only as much of the project's methods as seemed warranted to that teacher.

Most of these changes can be accounted for by the same sort of forces discussed above. Early successes exhausted the easy possibilities of congenial change and project techniques are often not adequate to more difficult problems. The early enthusiasm waned, critics mobilized the opposition, and reality kept battering away at grand expectations.

VI. NEAR TERM BEHAVIORAL CHANGE

Overall, the Rand project was an attempt to establish a number of things about how Federally-sponsored change agent projects were experienced in the field. Although success and/or failure was of course one of those experiences, the project was never an attempt to evaluate Federal policy and it was certainly never an attempt to evaluate discrete local projects.

While our disavowal of evaluation was an honest one, it could not be totally realized. Our primary purpose was to document the field reality of change agent projects but documentation implies some scheme for the selection of variables and how better to justify that selection than by reference to those things which, if changed, may improve practice? Second, once the documentation had been completed, the results had to be analyzed. To the maximum possible extent, we tried to let the data suggest explanations, we attempted to let patterns and hypotheses emerge naturally, and we tried to avoid prematurely categorizing projects by a dependent variable of success. Still, for applied social scientists it is very difficult to ignore a continuum or taxonomic principle which is always straining for recognition and which runs from "most-to-least successful." Finally, it should be remembered that we wished eventually to inform policy makers with respect to questions of educational change. Such a practical intent necessarily involves questions of the goodness of the programs. There is no way to assess the utility of Federal practices without having first assessed the utility of the various local experiences.

Therefore, we had to make very general estimates about the degrees of success of these projects. That judgment was based on the sorts of data which supported other parts of the study: the results from the extensive survey phase, any internal or external evaluations or audits available for each project, extensive interviewing in each site, and the evidence from our own observations of relevant outcomes while on site. For the staff development projects, we assigned the cases to only two categories -- most and least successful -- and put a remaining case into a mixed category because of its special characteristics. (A summary of the descriptive characteristics for each case by category is appended to the end of this section.) This section discusses the evidence of near-term behavioral change which could be attributed to the projects. The following two sections discuss the longer term outcomes which these projects may have, i.e., continuation and dissemination.

The most arresting finding from the cases was how little had been changed about any feature of the site (its teachers, social

context, student performance) which could be related to the project's intervention. There were changes but they seemed more episodic, faint, and dispersed than expected.

The only places where support for schooling, professional engagement, or morale changed were in the elementary and intermediate schools. The high schools were never affected. Three of the sites did succeed in improving teacher attitudes toward their work. The most dramatic case was the one in which the project was located in and confined to a single intermediate school. That school was a social-emotional wreck at the project's inception and by the end of the second year, the project efforts had demonstrably increased the staff's commitment, sense of responsibility, and personal investment. But the project had not yet succeeded in doing anything much about instructional styles.

On the other hand, a project which set out to work directly on teacher attitudes about and participation in school management failed to affect those things but did (somehow) manage to affect teaching styles. Apparently, the teachers learned about all the things that were supposed to be impediments to their communication with the school's management and then decided that the same phenomena were blocking their own communication with their students. For the other three projects, the attitudes of defensiveness, limited investment, and so on which characterize teaching as a quasi-profession and which contribute so heavily to determining teacher attitudes were simply too powerful to overcome with techniques applied.

If only three projects changed teacher attitudes toward their work and place of work, all the projects could claim some changes in instructional techniques among some of the staff. Those changes were all in the direction of better, i.e., more behaviorally indicated instruction, but the amount of people so affected varied widely. At the successful end of the range perhaps as many as a third of staff in as many as half of the project schools had changed as much as half of their instructional practice. The next most successful project could only claim changes of a similar magnitude in not more than 10 percent of its schools.

One of the keys to impact is the social and peer climate of the school. For change to be visible to the project leaders, or to most evaluations, it has to have a fairly dramatic and widespread impact on the school. But it seems certain that these projects had other impacts which, although not as visible, may in the aggregate be as important. First, there is the phenomenon of the isolated teacher who, alone among that school's staff, was affected, did change, and will persist in that change. In almost every school we visited there was at least one teacher who significantly departed from that school's norms and enacted a large portion of the project's techniques. Such "loners" have a difficult role to sustain but they were an important and often overlooked part of the project's accomplishment.

The second phenomenon probably accounts for even more of these projects' actual outcomes. That phenomenon deals with the tiny changes made at the margins of the instructional behavior of a great many teachers. Although the bulk of their practice might still appall the project staff, it remains a significant achievement if, after the project, "trained" teachers hit fewer students, allowed a slightly more interaction, coordinated one lesson plan a year with a neighbor, praised slightly more often, and so on. Not only are such changes barely visible and usually barely conscious, many teachers strain to deny them or at least deny that the project introduced them. Teacher defensiveness is such that many teachers with whom we talked deprecated project techniques and praised traditional instruction. But their classrooms frequently featured wall charts of student behavior, centers, and the paraphenalia of differentiated instruction. When asked to explain those features, they would usually claim to have been doing those things all along or to have invented them themselves although in fact that was not the case. In assessing the total impact of these projects, the contribution of these two groups -- the isolated "loners" and the "denying doers" -- needs to be added to the more dramatic and rare instances of school-wide transformation.

Given the faintness of these projects' impacts on the smaller population with which they were in more direct contact (the teachers), what can be said about the project's mediated impact on kids? Most projects claimed pupil changes of various magnitudes. But the project-generated achievement data seemed prey to the same problems which make all achievement data so notorious. Where projects set out to provide services directly to students, or to incorporate kids in the training group, that never happened. Still the children were undoubtedly the beneficiaries of some amount of the instructional changes stimulated by the projects.

In only one instance was the fate of the project of extreme interest to the district's superordinates. In that case, the project constituted 90 percent of their attempts at reforming the district, and thus they regarded it very highly. In another case, the project's resources were the only leverage available to a superordinate although he simply could not get a handle on them fast enough to turn a floundering activity to his own advantage. In most cases, superordinates were mildly pleased to have the projects as symbols of their modernity but indifferent to the outcomes.

The two least successful projects were presided over by classroom teachers who regarded their project roles as a temporary duty assignment. Especially in the concluding project years, when they were anticipating re-entry into the classroom, they studiously avoided making waves -- and thus nothing happened. The other three projects were all much more central to the career prospects of their administrators. For this group, the project

represented their first exposure to systematic, conscious, and concerted attempts to reform large parts of an educational organization. They enjoyed the experience and they would all do it again although all three expected to be forced out of their districts as a direct result of their project roles. In only one case was the departure anticipated as a violent event. But the other two came to understand that their critical attitudes toward their colleagues' work, their necessary advocacy of a "superior" position, and the removal of the protective project cocoon all made it prudent for them to seek employment elsewhere. Still, that other employment which they seek will most likely be in a role similar to their current one.

Figure One: Summarized Project Characteristics Related to Amount of Success

A. The Least Successful Cases

Case #4	Case #5
°Interrupted leadership. Some commitment but also uncertainty about content of techniques.	°Changing leadership. No confidence in techniques. Status quo orientation.
°No real goals. Search for problems which might be helped.	°Goals of organizational maintenance.
°Change from bottom up.	°No change intended.
°Simple project treatment.	°Laissez-faire, situationally determined project treatments.
°Consultant provision of materials with little on-site development. No trainee progress evaluation. Relevance only to one part of of the teacher's role (participation in management).	°No materials. High role relevance.
°Strong theoretical base but among consulting group, not project staff.	°No theoretical base.
°Limited availability of staff to project treatment.	°High availability of staff to project treatment.
°No rewards, only risks.	°No rewards.
°Low felt need among a knowledgeable but complacent and suspicious population.	°No felt need among a veteran and extremely resistant population.
°Superordinate opposition; opposition from principals.	°Superordinate support; subversion by principals.
°No peer group support. No critical mass.	°Same

B. The Two Most Successful Cases

Case #1	Case #2
°An integral, highly committed management group that stayed with the project from its initiation on. The group provided itself with social and material support against opposition.	°Same as #1 plus overtones of true-believer, messianic and revoluntionary spirit.
°A goal of substantial transformation in the most important areas of the district's teaching practices.	°A goal of revolutionary change in all parts of the system.
°Change initiated from the central office middle management level down.	°Change initiated from the higer reaches of the central office down.
°A relatively complicated project treatment with several components and sequences.	°An extremely complicated and comprehensive treatment.
°Strong emphasis on on-site development of materials and written curriculum. Material to allow multiple entry points, teacher pacing, and independent but non-invidious evaluation. Highly role-relevant training.	°Same as 1.
	°Strong theoretical base.
°Availability of some staff assistance on site.	°Limited on-site staff assistance. Some demonstration lessons.
°Some material rewards as reinforcement for continuation not as incentive to begin.	°Same as 1.
°Very high felt need among an innocent and trusting training population.	°High felt need among an innocent but xenophobic training population. Some teacher motion in a direction of the project could reinforce.
°No opposition; some principal support.	°Opposition and very little limited support from principals.
°Peer group support in the schools and several critical masses.	°More limited supported and fewer critical masses.

C. The Mixed Case

Case #3.

This case is different from the others in that the project leadership refused to force the pace of the training activities until they felt that the majority of the school's faculty wanted to change and had assimilated an OD truth/trust attitude. Thus, in the first two years of what was nominally a project to differentiate instruction, there had been no attempt to communicate the technology or content of staff development.

°A single leader through the project but a management group which was elected by the teachers and thus fluctuated. Some cohesion against opposition.

°A goal of substantial change in several areas but patience about the rate of progress.

°Top support and several superordinate moves that paralleled and reinforced the project's moves.

°A persistent stress on a single theme (truth-trust) to date.

°A fetish about bootstraps. Total on-site determination of project activities but few materials. Independent, non-invidious evaluation. Focus to date not perceived as being very role relevant.

°Material but not staff assistance to trainees. No demonstration lessons.

°High felt need among a frustrated and suspicious population.

°No opposition; support from principal.

°Very strong peer group support and critical mass, but at only one grade level.

VII. CONTINUATION

The key question here is, what characteristics of the project were likely to be continued after the end of Federal support. To iterate the point made in the methodology discussion, this judgment was in large part an informed guesstimate.

The continuation of project efforts in the most successful district appeared assured if only because the materials and procedures produced will remain intact and the training activities were never dependent on pacing or guidance by the teachers themselves. Thus the project's dissolution should still leave a stock of materials with which many of the district's teachers have already had a favorable experience. To add to that happy prospect, the project staff had lobbied hard and successfully to get completion of parts of the training materials accepted as qualification for a higher step on the district's pay scale. Then, when the SEA required all districts to come up with a new set of performance competencies for re-certification of their faculties, the project staff successfully inserted their project's own list of desired teacher outcomes. All teachers must now pay more careful attention to those standards. Since the project never had to face any significant opposition and since a high proportion of the district's teachers have had a favorable experience with the training, the prospects for the project's continuation seems good.

It needs to be noted, however, that as a discrete special-purpose staff, this project will not be continued. The headquarters specialists will return to the units from which they came, and they may continue to do some project-related activities, but beyond that and the provision of a small amount of money to cover materials, the "project" nature of these activities will disappear. The more important continuing participation in the training activities will not.

Similar points may be made with respect to the other of the clearly successful project sites. There, the staff anticipated from the beginning that the re-emergence of the conservative forces would sooner or later overwhelm the project. Part of the staff's drive to produce a great many materials, and to infiltrate all parts of their bureaucracy was in preparation for that contingency. The hope was that out of a "blanket" or "cascade" of services, some would survive. In addition, in order to guard against backsliding on the part of project personnel who were returning to their former (unreconstructed) environs all such personnel were required to undergo the complete training cycle a second time. The project's enemies have moved vigorously against it, but the project will have "gone underground" and thus the activities should survive to a certain extent.

In the mixed case school, where the project's development has so far been arrested at a stage substantially prior to the enactment of many of the project's goals and technology, it is very hard to predict continuation. The theoretical justification for emphasizing interpersonal communications is so that the ensuing changes will be more profound and more lasting. So one hopes.

The most that can be hoped for the other schools is that those relatively fewer teachers whose behavior was affected will not return to their old patterns of behavior. There is a lot of evidence to support that expectation. Most of the teachers whose instructional practices were changed as a result of these projects were already somewhat dissatisfied with their performance or became persuaded of its inadequacy. There was a great deal of consensus about how impossible it would be to move back to large group, teacher-talk instruction and, to a person, our respondents denied that they ever would. Thus, at the atomistic but still important level of the individual, continuation seems to have a reasonable prospect.

VIII. DISSEMINATION DIFFUSION

The key question here was whether the project got disseminated to other schools or districts. There is not a great deal that can be said about what hasn't happened. Only two projects demonstrated any real impact on any schools other than the target schools. In both cases that effort was linked to the personal drives of the project's leadership. In one case, the leader was a former professor who had a habit of publication and a need for career-enchancing publicity. In the other case, the project director had set up a statewide organization of project directors as a defense against what he felt was SEA interference. He did a lot of speaking, inevitably about his own experiences, and therefore got a lot of publicity, visits, and requests for information from his colleagues.

All projects felt hampered by SEA and Federal regulations putting stringent conditions on their dissemination activities. In the absence of any broader audience, the only people to whom the project might be diffused were the other schools in each district. That did not happen either.

It was a unanimous experience of these projects that, regardless of their degrees of success, they were studiously ignored by their district colleagues. Although the school may have been a virtual Walden III, visitors were still more likely to come from 200 miles away than from 2 miles away. The educator's insecurity is probably the chief explanation for this. Someone working in the same environment with roughly the same resources who does a demonstrably better job is seen as a threat, a show-off, and probably a cheat. The same phenomenon applies among faculties. Teacher trainers are much more acceptable when they travel to neighboring schools than when they try to ply their trade in their own schools. The educator's response is to ignore the lighthouse school if it is close to home and instead go far enough away so that (a) asking for help can be a more anonymous and "safer" experience; (b) it won't be necessary to acknowledge the superiority of someone with whom you are in competition; and (c) the ideas can be changed with inpunity and then (d) credited to one's self.